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Performance of Hungarian firms: are apprentices an asset or a 
liability? 
Evidence from a unique matched employer-employee dataset 
Sofie Cabus and Eszter Nagy 
Abstract  
Hungarian legislation provides firms with financial incentives to train apprentices 
from vocational training schools. In line with these incentives, it is observed that 
firms increasingly train apprentices over the period 2003-2011, in particular, in the 
sectors manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail and hotels and restaurants. 
However, at the same time, it is observed that firms decreasingly retain the trained 
apprentices in these four sectors. This finding leads to the hypothesis that 
apprentices are not profitable in the long run. The formulated hypothesis is known in 
the previous literature as the ‘substitution strategy’. This recruiting strategy is 
particularly observed among firms that replace their low-skilled labour with 
apprentices in order to reduce the cost of wages. For these firms it is not beneficial to 
hire an apprentice after accomplishing his training, because then he becomes a low-
skilled worker paid at higher wages. This paper investigates the effect of the share of 
days worked by apprentices on productivity and gross profits of Hungarian firms by 
using a unique matched employer-employee dataset. Different approaches that allow 
us to estimate the effect are discussed among which fixed effects first-difference 
models and system GMM. The results indicate that apprentices decrease productivity 
and gross profits of Hungarian firms. These negative effects on firm performance 
were more prominent and robust before (2003-2007) than after the financial crisis 
(2008-2011). 
JEL: I21, J24, L25 
Keywords: apprenticeship training, firm performance, panel data 
Acknowledgement 
The project leading to this application has received funding from the European Union's 
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 691676. 
 
 
4 
 
Tanoncok foglalkoztatásának hatása a magyar vállalatok 
termelékenységére 
Sofie Cabus és Nagy Eszter 
Összefoglaló  
A magyar szabályozási környezet pénzügyileg ösztönzi a vállalatokat a szakiskolai 
tanoncok képzésére és a magyar kormány kiemelt prioritásának tekinti a duális 
szakképzés fellendítését. Ezen ösztönzőkkel összhangban 2003 és 2011 között a 
magyar vállalatok egyre nagyobb arányban vettek részt a tanoncképzésben, 
elsősorban a feldolgozóipar, építőipar, kereskedelem és a szálloda és vendéglátóipar 
területén. Azonban a növekvő vállalati tanoncképzés ellenére, a vállaltok egyre kisebb 
arányban alkalmazták az általuk képzett tanoncokat a szakvizsga megszerzése után 
ebben a négy szektorban. E megfigyelések alapján arra következtethetünk, hogy a 
tanoncok alkalmazása hosszabb távon nem kifizetődő a vállalatok számára. Az 
irodalom ezt vállalati viselkedést „helyettesítési stratégiának” nevezi. A helyettesítési 
stratégiát követő vállalatok tanoncokkal helyettesítik az általuk alkalmazott 
alacsonyan képzett munkaerő egy részét a bérköltségek csökkentésének érdekében. 
Azonban ezen vállaltok számára nem kifizetődő a tanoncok szakvizsga utáni 
alkalmazása, mivel ilyenkor a nekik fizetendő bérek megemelkednek. Tanulmányunk 
azt vizsgálja, milyen hatással van a vállaltoknál alkalmazott tanoncok által 
ledolgozott napok aránya a vállalatok bruttó profitjára és termelékenységére. 
Elemzésünkhöz kacsolt dolgozói-céges adminisztratív adatbázis használtunk. A fenti 
hatás megbecsléséhez több különböző identifikációs stratégiát is alkalmaztunk 
(többek között fixhatás és system GMM modelleket). Eredményeink szerint a 
tanoncok alkalmazása csökkenti a magyar vállaltok profitját és termelékenységét. 
Továbbá a megfigyelt negatív hatások erősebbek voltak a gazdasági válság előtt (a 
2003-2007 között), mint a válság utáni időszakban (2008 és 2011 között). 
 
JEL: I21, J24, L25 
Tárgyszavak: tanoncképzés, vállalati teljesítmény, panel adatbázis 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Previous literature indicated the complex net cost puzzle of training apprentices with firm 
specific skills (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Dionisius et al., 2009; Muehlemann et al., 2010). 
Firms may be reluctant to train apprentices, whereas training is costly and time-intensive, 
and return on investment is insecure. Nonetheless, many firms are training apprentices 
(Eichhorst et al., 2012). It is observed in the European Union (28 countries) in 2015 that 
about 10.3 million of students (47.3 percent) followed a vocational education or training 
programme (VET) at the level of upper secondary education (Eurostat, ec.europa.eu, June 
2017). Among these EU-28 countries, Finland (71.3 percent), Croatia (70.4 percent), and 
Austria (69.5 percent) capture largest shares of students enrolled in upper secondary VET. 
Contrary, EU-28 countries with rather low shares are Malta (12.7 percent), Cyprus (15.6 
percent), and Hungary (23.2 percent).  
There are at least two particular reasons why firms train apprentices despite the costs and 
risks associated with it (e.g. Beckmann, 2002). First, firms invest in the human capital of 
students in order to reveal the competences and abilities of the trained apprentices 
(Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Muehlemann et al., 2016). At the end of the training period, 
good apprentices can be retained, while at the same time, firms get return on the trained 
specific skills. Moreover, it can result in better match quality and lower turnover rates 
(Muehlemann et al., 2016). This recruiting strategy of firms is called the ‘investment 
strategy’. Second, firms that wish to reduce the wage bill can choose for replacing low-skilled 
workers with apprentices. It is then implicitly assumed that apprentices can perform as well 
as low-skilled workers on the job, if, and only if, firms wish to sustain productivity and gross 
profit. This recruiting strategy of firms is called the ‘substitution strategy’. According to 
Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner (2010), in Germany, 18.5 percent of firms follow a 
substitution strategy, while 43.7 percent follow an investment strategy. 
There are relatively few studies that estimate the causal impact of apprentice training on 
firm productivity and performance (Bajgar and Criscuolo, 2016). Nonetheless, the previous 
literature provides some empirical evidence on the (lack of) profitability of both types of 
recruiting strategies. Best-evidence is presented by Mohrenweiser and Zwick (2009). The 
authors combine an administrative dataset on the employees with company survey data in 
order to construct a matched employer-employee dataset. The dataset covers the period 1997 
to 2002. Different identification strategies are applied in order to aim at causal effects, 
including fixed effects, first-difference models, and system GMM. Mohrenweiser and Zwick 
(ibidem) find that, on the one hand, an increase in the share of apprentices in the training 
company relative to low-skilled workers negatively impacts firm performance in the sector 
manufacturing. They attribute this negative sign to the efficiency of the apprenticeship 
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system in Germany, namely: employers are willing to bare a net cost when: (1) apprentices 
are more likely to stay in the training company after the training period; (2) the skills learned 
at the training company are firm-specific; and (3) it is difficult to find employees skilled for 
the job on the external labour market. On the other hand, the authors estimate a positive 
impact of training apprentices in the short-run in the sectors commercial & trade and crafts & 
construction. It is argued that apprentices, who are trained with more general skills, and who 
face higher between-firm mobility on the labour market, more likely substitute away low-
skilled workers when apprentices are (at least) as productive for the company as low-skilled 
workers. However, it should be noted that retention rates of about 77 percent are mentioned 
for the sector manufacturing. These rates can be compared with 72 percent for the sector 
trade & commercial and 61.5 percent for the sector crafts and construction (Mohrenweiser 
and Zwick, 2009, p.632, footnote 5). As such, in Germany mean retention rates are high for 
sectors with high shares of apprentices, not directly providing evidence for strong between-
firm mobility in sectors that apply substitution strategies. 
Another explanation for the negative impact of apprenticeship training on firm-level 
productivity and gross profits in the manufacturing sector in Germany can be found in 
Dionisius et al. (2009). These authors compare the apprenticeship training net cost in 
Germany with Switzerland, and, therefore, they estimate matching models for average 
treatment effects. They rely on data from two firm-level surveys with the reference year 
2000. Dionisius et al. (ibidem) indicate negative net costs associated with training 
apprentices in Germany, but positive net costs in Switzerland. From their results, it is argued 
that the (lack of) profitability of training apprentices in the short-run can be explained by 
how productive the tasks, allocated to apprentices, are. In particular, allocating more 
productive tasks to apprentices (in Switzerland) is better for firm performance. Other factors 
than can explain differences in the net cost between Germany and Switzerland are relative 
wages and different regulations of the VET-system. Apprentices in Switzerland earn higher 
wages than in Germany, which can partly be explained by the fact that apprentices also 
conduct more productive tasks within the training company. Furthermore, Swiss companies 
are enforced to employ apprentices in a cost-efficient way due to less employment protection 
legislation in Switzerland compared to Germany. This, in turn, can stimulate Swiss firms to 
apply substitution recruiting strategies more frequently than German firms (for a discussion 
particular on the influence of labour market regulations on the investment/substitution 
strategy, see also Muehlemann et al., 2010). 
This paper contributes to the previous literature in several ways. First, we estimate the 
effect of apprentice training on firm performance in another European Union country than 
Germany or Switzerland, namely: Hungary. Similarly to other European countries, increasing 
apprenticeship training is a special priority for the Hungarian government (Muehlemann, 
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2016; Kis et al, 2008). However, the Hungarian vocational education and training (VET-) 
system is unique compared to other OECD countries. For example, all firms have a financial 
incentive (provided by the government) to train apprentices (Section Hiba! A hivatkozási 
forrás nem található.). In line with Beckmann (2002), financial incentives can be 
important for encouraging firms to train apprentices.  
Second, the unique administrative matched employer-employee dataset for Hungary 
covering the period 2003-2011 is a particular strong contribution to the previous literature. 
Owing to the Hungarian legislation, we can precisely identify individual apprentices still 
studying in vocational training schools in the data.1 We observe the full work history of all 
individuals (incl. apprentices and regular workers) working at the training establishment. 
Owing to this information, we are able to distinguish between unexperienced apprentices (< 1 
year of experience), and experienced apprentices (>1 year of experience). In this respect, 
Bajgar and Criscuolo (2016) argue that firm productivity may depend on the stage in the 
apprentice training progress, since apprentices with more experience at the firm are more 
likely to perform productive tasks. Finally, owing to detailed dataset on firms, it is possible to 
estimate the productivity effects of apprenticeship training on firms directly, using detailed 
firm balance sheet data. 
Third, in line with previous findings from the literature on Switzerland and Germany, it is 
hypothesized that, in the short-run, during the training period, investment strategies yield 
negative effects of employing apprentices on firm performance. Here, the idea is that firms 
are willing to incur a net cost in the short-run, because they can retrieve the benefits of 
training by hiring apprentices with revealed firm-specific skills in the long-run. Contrary, 
substitution strategies yield positive effects, whereas these firms are production-oriented and 
cost-efficient. These strategies often go along with allocating productive tasks to apprentices, 
including firm- or government- financed training opportunities in general skills, and, hereby, 
low retention rates in the long-run owing to higher between-firm mobility. It is tested in this 
paper whether these results hold for Hungary by using similar identification strategies as in 
Mohrenweiser and Zwick (2009).  
We find that the net cost puzzle is even more complex for Hungary. We observe that 
apprentices are increasingly trained in the sectors manufacturing; construction; wholesale, 
retail and repair; and hotels and restaurants over the period 2003-2011. At the same time, we 
observe that retention rates are relatively low (just above 20 percent in 2003), at least 
compared to Germany, for example, and are falling to nearly 10 percent in 2011. These two 
observations taken together indicate substitution strategies. Horn (2016) found that there is 
no significant difference in employment opportunities between students participating in 
school-based and workplace-based practical training during the year after graduation, which 
                                                        
1 Hungarian legislation stipulates that apprentices have to work with special government regulated contracts. 
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is also in line with substitution strategies. However, we estimate negative or zero effects of 
apprenticeship training in Hungary on firm performance, which would be more indicative for 
investment strategies. Noelke and Horn (2014) found that that declining employer 
involvement in apprenticeship training leads to higher unemployment on graduation, which 
indicates that (at least some of the) firms use apprenticeship training as screening process for 
potential new employees. Additional investigations indicate that the negative effects on firm 
performance were more prominent and robust before (2003-2007) than after the financial 
crisis (2008-2011).  
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the Hungarian VET-system and 
legislation. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy for estimating the effect of apprentice 
training on firm performance. Data and descriptive statistics are discussed in Section4, and 
the results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. THE HUNGARIAN VET SYSTEM 
The Hungarian VET-system combines school-based vocational education and employer-
provided workplace based training. Generally, after completing lower secondary education, at 
14 year-old, VET-oriented students choose between vocational training schools (szakiskola), 
that offer dual system VET, or vocational secondary schools (szakközépiskola). 
Approximately 65% of students choose some form of VET education after finishing 8th grade, 
of which around 40% continue in vocational secondary schools and around 25% in vocational 
training schools. However the total number of enrolled students consistently decreased over 
the examined time period. (Hungarian Ministry of Human Resources (2012)) 
Only vocational secondary schools deliver diplomas to students that qualify for admission 
to higher education. As such, obtaining a vocational diploma from vocational training schools 
does not qualify for entry to higher education. Vocational training schools generally aim at 
training students for low- and semi-skilled blue collar occupations such as: cook, 
construction worker, waitress, bellhop, hairdresser or electrician.  
Vocational training school programs between 2003 and 2011 provided general and pre-
vocational education and training in the first two years; that were followed by one to three 
(generally two) years of practical training at ISCED 2C or 3C level to obtain a vocational 
qualification.2  (CEDEFOP, 2011) The practical training part of the program can be school-
based, or workplace-based. School-based training is where the school organizes the training 
using their vocational teachers in workshops (which can be, but necessarily be physically in 
the school building). Workplace-based training is where the school or the student herself 
organize the practical training at a private firm. In this case a special tri-party contract is 
                                                        
2 In September 2010 ‘early VET programmes’ (előrehozott szakiskolai képzés) were introduced which offer three 
years of vocational training right after completion lower secondary education. 
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required (“tanulószerződés”) between the firm, the student and the vocational training 
school. There is no clear rule which allocates students between school-based and workplace 
based practical training and we know relatively little about these allocation mechanisms. 
(Horn, 2016) In 2011 about 60% of the 11th 12th grade vocational training school students 
participated in workplace-based training programs and 40% of them in school-based 
practical training (based on KIR-STAT 2011, table a05t24).  
Since selection into the different types of practical training is highly decentralized 
(students can organize their own workplace-based training themselves) it might not be 
random. However, Horn (2016) found that after taking local labour market conditions into 
account, individual background characteristics do not determine the decision to participate 
in work based or school based training.  
Training firms are required to compensate apprentices for their work, although the 
magnitude of this compensation is very small. The required payment is 20% of the minimum 
wage per month, which was about 50 euros in 2011. 
Hungarian firms have financial incentives to train apprentices from vocational training 
schools, facilitated by the Hungarian legislation. All employers are required to pay a 
compulsory “VET contribution” (szakképzési hozzájárulás) to the government, which is 1.5% 
of the total payroll of the firm. However, employers are also allowed to spend their VET 
contribution on training apprentices themselves, by offering direct support to a VET 
institution, or by training their own employees3 (Kis et al, 2008). This unique legislative 
environment likely increases the number of firms training apprentices, hence making 
Hungary a viable candidate for our analysis. 
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
We estimate a Cobb Douglas Production Function that includes indicators for human capital 
and physical capital and also accounts for the firms' state of technology. In particular, we 
estimate: 
𝑙𝑛(𝜋𝑗𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 +
𝛽1𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙(𝑚)𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙(ℎ)𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1 ln(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑗𝑡) + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑗𝑡 + (𝜈𝑗 + 𝜌𝑗𝜏𝑡) + 𝜀𝑗    ,     (1) 
where outcome measure  𝑙𝑛(𝜋𝑗𝑡) is the value of total production per worker (VTP) (i.e. gross 
profit) of firm 𝑗 in year 𝑡. The same specification written in Equation (1) will also be estimated 
                                                        
3 For the former two options firms cannot use the whole amount of their mandatory VET contribution. They can 
use up to 70% of the total contribution for offering direct support for secondary institutions and 35% for 
supporting tertiary institutions. Larger firms can use up to 33% and small and medium enterprises up to 60% 
of the total contribution to train their own workers. Also the possibility of training own employees ended in 
2012 Jan because of a legislation change, but this does not affect our analysis. 
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for the outcome variable total productivity per worker of firm 𝑗 in year 𝑡. Total productivity is 
computed as gross profit minus the wage bill of the firm. 
In order to increase homogeneity across firms, and in line with Mohrenweiser and Zwick 
(2009), we solely focus on four sectors (industries) that heavily employ apprentices in 
Hungary, namely: manufacturing; construction; wholesale, retail and repair; and hotels and 
restaurants.  
With respect to the specification of human capital, we adhere to the previous work of 
Dearden et al. (2006) and Mohrenweiser and Zwick (2009). These authors compare the value 
of marginal productivity (VMP) of apprentices with VMP of semi- and low-skilled employees 
working at a firm. Apprentices and semi- and unskilled employees are usually expressed in 
percent shares, however, the firm-level data also allows us to express these indicators in days 
worked at the firm within a particular year. Hereby, we can be more accurate on actual 
productivity of the employees.  
The parameters 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑗𝑡; 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗𝑡; 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑗𝑡; 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 denote the 
percent share of days worked by apprentices in the sectors manufacturing; construction; 
wholesale, retail and repair; and hotels and restaurants, respectively. The reference category 
is then the share of days worked by regular employees at the firm. We also include 
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙(𝑚)𝑗𝑡 and 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙(ℎ)𝑗𝑡 in order to compare the share of medium (or semi-) and 
high skilled workers with the share of low skilled apprentices. This way the reference category 
becomes the share of days worked by low skilled regular employees at the firm. These control 
variables can be particularly interesting for statistical inference on replacing cost-intensive 
semi- and low-skilled labour for apprentices at the time of a negative shock on gross profit. 
This will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
Factual comparing the VMP of apprentices with ‘regular’ employees can hamper 
statistical inference because of two specific reasons (Bajgar and Criscuolo, 2016). First, the 
estimates are liable to omitted variables bias and self-selection bias due to unobserved 
background characteristics like ability and motivation. Second, correlational estimates are 
most likely biased due to the firms’ endogenous recruiting process (Cabus and Somers, 2017). 
For example, firms could have altered the human capital mix in response to the financial 
crisis of 2008 and Great Recession, in essence an exogenous aggregate activity shock on the 
labour market that also impacts firms’ performance. It is observed that Hungary immediately 
felt the consequences of economic contraction on the labour market (Eurostat, 2016). 
Because of economic contraction, firms may have replaced cost-intensive semi- and low-
skilled labour for apprentices, while, at the same time, a negative shock on revenue (VTP) can 
be observed. One may then wrongly conclude that increasing the percent share of apprentices 
in the firm declines VTP. These endogeneity issues (or ‘simultaneity of events’) usually tend 
to over- or underestimate the ‘true’ effects of employing apprentices at the firm on VTP. 
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We deal with these aforementioned issues in several ways. First, we estimate a Cobb 
Douglas Production Function that controls for trends and time invariant (unobserved) 
information with respect to the shares of days worked by apprentices over time (𝜏𝑡); the 
industry wherein the firm operates (𝜌𝑗); and the firm (𝜈𝑗). Doing so, in particular, we 
estimate the change in percent share of (or days worked by) apprentices between time 𝑡 − 1 
and 𝑡 on the change in VTP. This corresponds to a first-difference model. Second, it is 
acknowledged that estimating a first-difference model does not solve the issue of 
endogeneity. Therefore, it is proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to instrument the change 
in percent share of (or days worked by) apprentices with the fourth lag of the corresponding 
variable. Indeed, contemporary exogenous aggregate activity shocks have no effect on lagged 
variables.  
As such, the instrument lag of apprentices (𝑡 − 1) has been instrumented by using the 
change in share of apprentices between time period (𝑡 − 2) and (𝑡 − 3), so that we need at 
least four subsequent periods of observation (from time 𝑡 to time 𝑡 − 3) of one firm. Hereby, 
we estimate a dynamic panel data model and, according to Blundell and Bond (1998), 
optimal moment (or instrument) conditions are found by applying general methods of 
moments (GMM). We have applied the same empirical strategy to the share of days worked 
by apprentices in the four industries manufacturing; construction; wholesale, retail and 
repair; and hotels and restaurants. Taking all these equations together, our chosen empirical 
strategy is often referred to as system GMM. 
With respect to the specification of physical capital, we include an indicator for the 
logarithm of yearly depreciation denoted by ln(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑗𝑡). This variable is included in order to 
control for differences between firms with respect to (optimal) size and economies of scale. 
Hereby, it is acknowledged that smaller firms will have a more rapid a decline in marginal 
revenue from employing an additional worker (i.e. an apprentice or semi- or low-skilled 
worker). 
The vector 𝑋𝑘𝑗𝑡 denotes a set of control variables. In particular, we control for the firm 
workforce composition in terms of share of days worked by prime aged (25-55) and older 
workers (55+) and share of days worked by people in a second job. We also include other 
control variables measured at the level of the firm, namely: the firm size; year of the firm 
entry into the dataset; whether the firm is exporting production and/or services to foreign 
countries; and an indicator for foreign ownership. 
To conclude, a standard Cobb Douglas Production Function includes the firms' state of 
technology by including a fixed parameter (often denoted by: A). Higher technological 
advances are associated with capital-intense production, more high-skilled- and fewer low-
skilled workers. We control for these potential differences across firms and across industries 
in several ways. First, in the short-run, the state of technology can be considered constant 
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over time. A first-difference model then controls for technological advances. Second, in case 
there would be some variation over time, we control for capital expansion by including the 
variable yearly depreciation. Third, by using the fourth lag as an instrument for change in 
percent share of apprentices, one avoids the effects of contemporary capital expansion on 
(endogenous) hiring decisions of the firm (Blundell and Bond, 1998). To conclude, we 
estimate a first-difference instrumental variables specification that also includes a constant 
parameter. It is argued that the constant of the regression captures the variation that cannot 
be explained by the aforementioned variables. 
4. DATA 
We use unique Hungarian administrative data that matches employer information to 
employee information. The baseline dataset is a 50% sample of the whole population aged 5-
74 in 2003. The employee data contains monthly observations of basic demographic 
information and complete work and social transfer history at monthly basis on all individuals 
between January 2003 and December 2011. Furthermore, we have yearly balance sheet data 
on private firms that correspond to the employees in the data.  
We can identify apprentices working with the special student contract required for 
apprenticeship training mention in the previous section in the data. Unfortunately the 
dataset does not contain educational background information for all individuals, only for 
people who were registered as unemployed between 2003 and 2011 (completed level of 
education) and for people who studied in or after 2009. Therefore we only considered 
apprentices who were at most 19 years old at the end of their apprenticeship in order to rule 
out apprentices in tertiary education. We also excluded people working as apprentices in the 
educational sector, because we suspect these are firms specializing in apprentice training 
working closely with private vocational training schools, doing basically private, school based 
practical training.  
Based on KIR-STAT (2011; Table a05t24) there were 36 960 younger than 19 years old 
students completing practical training in private firms with special student contracts in 2011. 
In our data (which is a 50% sample) we found 16 824 apprentices in 2011, so we are able to 
identify over 90 percent of all apprentices.  
To estimate the effect of apprentice training on firm performance we constructed a yearly 
firm panel from our baseline dataset. We computed the share of apprentices and days worked 
by apprentices in every year. We also calculated shares of low skilled, medium skilled and 
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high skilled workers in the firms4 and the shares of young workers (younger than 25 years 
old), prime aged workers (25-55 years old) and older workers (older than 55 years old).  
In our sample we only used firms with minimum 5 number of employees on average to 
reduce measurement error from using worker shares. Furthermore, because requirements of 
the two-step system GMM specification (Section 3) we restricted our analysis to firms with at 
least four observations in the dataset with no bigger gaps than three years between 
observations.  
Figure 1.  
Total Number of Apprentices by Industry 
 
Finally, as you can see from Figure 1., there are only four broadly defined industries with 
significant number of apprentices in firms in our data: manufacturing, construction, 
wholesale and retail and hotels and restaurants. These four sectors cover on average 93 
percent of all apprentices in total. Therefore we restricted our analysis to these four sectors.  
Table A1. (appendix) indicates the number of observations and firms in each stage in our data 
selection process. The final sample consists of 43 214 firms and 308 327 observations. 
                                                        
4 To estimate skill level of the different workers we used the highest skilled job between 2003 and 2011, based 
on occupational codes, as a proxy for skill level. We also used the available limited educational information to 
improve the classification.  
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Table 1. presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used for the empirical analysis. 
The most important findings from this table is that the majority of the firms in Hungary do 
not train apprentices. The share of firms with at least one apprentice in every year increased 
consistently over the examined time period from 2 percent in 2003 to 8 percent in 2011.  
Table 1.  
Basic Descriptive Statistics 
 
Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Low skilled share 308,327 0.127 0.184 
Apprentice share 308,327 0.006 0.041 
Apprentice share in manufacturing 308,327 0.001 0.017 
Apprentice share in construction 308,327 0.001 0.018 
Apprentice share in wholesale 308,327 0.002 0.020 
Apprentice share in hotels 308,327 0.002 0.026 
Medium skilled share 308,327 0.632 0.267 
High skilled share 308,327 0.241 0.252 
    Young share (<25) 308,327 0.099 0.155 
Prime aged share (25-55) 308,327 0.821 0.201 
Old share (>55) 308,327 0.076 0.147 
Second job share 308,327 0.022 0.093 
    Log(productivity) 291,263 7.775 0.940 
Productivity (in 1000 HUF) 307,020 3711.123 36677.81 
Log(gross profits) 242,060 6.798 1.354 
Gross profits (in 1000 HUF) 305,546 1703.415 36258.35 
Log(depreciation) 300,824 8.028 1.749 
Depreciation (in 1000 HUF) 302,720 31384.75 621476.20 
Foreign 308,327 0.115 0.319 
Exporting 308,327 0.272 0.445 
    Firm size    
5-10 308,327 0.413 0.492 
11-20 308,327 0.247 0.431 
21-50 308,327 0.147 0.354 
51-300 308,327 0.082 0.274 
301- 308,327 0.012 0.111 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 OLS 
Table A2. (appendix) presents the baseline OLS results (without controlling for firm fixed 
effects). The share of days worked by low skilled regular workers is the reference category. 
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Consequently, the estimates for the apprentice share across industries in Table A2. (and all 
other tables below) should interpreted as ‘substituting away from low-skilled regular workers 
towards training/employing apprentices’. Hereby, we apply a direct way of testing for the 
influence of the substitution recruiting strategy on firm performance (Section 3). For 
example, we find negative and significant correlations between the share of days worked by 
apprentices and both productivity and gross profit in all four industries. From this, we can 
then conclude that substituting away from low-skilled labour towards apprentices is 
associated with a decline in firm performance. 
Table 2.  
Fixed Effects Results 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 
Productivity Gross Profit Productivity Gross Profit 
Apprentice Share Manufacturing -0.133 -0.583*** -0.154 -0.641*** 
 
(0.101) (0.214) (0.100) (0.198) 
Apprentice Share Construction 0.092 -0.015 0.085 -0.038 
 
(0.090) (0.159) (0.087) (0.151) 
Apprentice Share Wholesale and Retail -0.110 -0.275 -0.110 -0.245 
 
(0.098) (0.168) (0.099) (0.166) 
Apprentice Share Hotels and Restaurants -0.283*** -0.812*** -0.265*** -0.693*** 
 
(0.084) (0.174) (0.084) (0.172) 
Share of medium skilled Yes yes yes Yes 
Share of high skilled Yes yes yes Yes 
Log Depreciation Yes yes yes Yes 
Industry-year dummies Yes yes yes Yes 
Share of different age groups 
  
yes Yes 
Share of people in second jobs 
  
yes Yes 
Firm controls 
  
yes Yes 
     Observations 286,647 239,290 286,647 239,290 
Number of firms 42,740 41,134 42,740 41,134 
Adjusted R-squared 0.068 0.030 0.098 0.086 
Notes: Productivity and gross profit are measured per capita. The share of days worked by low skilled regular 
workers is the reference category. Significance level presented at 1-percent (***); 5-percent (**); and 10-percent 
(*). 
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Table 3.  
System GMM Results 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 
Productivity Gross Profit Productivity Gross Profit 
y(t-1) 0.289*** 0.278*** 0.277*** 0.242*** 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Apprentice Share Manufacturing -0.573** -2.314*** -0.099 -1.487*** 
 
(0.285) (0.484) (0.280) (0.425) 
Apprentice Share Construction -0.597*** -1.240*** -0.311 -1.015*** 
 
(0.219) (0.386) (0.212) (0.373) 
Apprentice Share Wholesale and Retail -1.952*** -2.827*** -1.188*** -2.116*** 
 
(0.195) (0.466) (0.184) (0.422) 
Apprentice Share Hotels and Restaurants -0.723*** -1.874*** -0.311* -1.058*** 
 
(0.167) (0.417) (0.167) (0.404) 
Share of medium skilled yes yes yes yes 
Share of high skilled yes yes yes yes 
Log Depreciation yes yes yes yes 
Industry-year dummies yes yes yes yes 
Share of different age groups 
  
yes yes 
Share of people in second jobs 
  
yes yes 
Firm controls 
  
yes yes 
    
yes 
Observations 238,080 183,217 238,080 183,217 
Number of firms 41,377 37,453 41,377 37,453 
Number of instruments 336 336 346 346 
Wald chi2 20,405 3.189e+06 1.450e+07 19,008 
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1) in first differences 
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hansen test of over-identification restrictions 
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: Productivity and gross profit are measured per capita. The share of days worked by low skilled regular 
workers is the reference category. Significance level presented at 1-percent (***); 5-percent (**); and 10-percent 
(*). 
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5.2 FIXED EFFECTS 
As presented in Section 4, only a selected number of firms participate in apprenticeship 
training and selection into training is endogenous, so we should definitely control for firm-
specific characteristics. Table 2. demonstrates the results using a firm fixed effects model. 
Columns (1) and (2) show the results of the baseline specification, and columns (3) and (4) 
add additional control variables dealing with the share of different age groups, the share of 
people in second jobs, and other (non-fixed) firm control variables. 
For the outcome variable ‘per capita productivity’, we only found significant and negative 
correlations in the hotels and restaurants sector. For example, the coefficients in Table 2., 
column (3), indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of days worked by 
apprentices (compared to the share of the share of days worked by low skilled regular 
employees) correlates with a decrease of 0.265 percent in firm per capita productivity. For 
the outcome variable ‘gross profits’, the estimate is also significantly negative for the 
manufacturing sector, even though we find no significant negative correlation between share 
of days worked by apprentices and per capita productivity. There are no significant 
correlations estimated for the sector construction and wholesale and retail.5 
5.3 SYSTEM GMM 
In order to further control for potential problems with simultaneity, mostly present in times 
of economic crisis (Section 3), Table 3. presents the results from using system GMM.  We 
have applied xtabond2 in the statistical software package of Stata (Roodman, 2006). In 
addition, we imposed common factor restrictions using a minimum distance estimator in 
order to obtain a single coefficient for all covariates in the dynamic model (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). We have done this by using the user created stata command md_ar1 (Söderbom 
2009). 
The results from Table 3. indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of days 
worked by apprentices (compared to the share of days worked by low skilled regular workers) 
decreases the firms’ gross profit per capita in all four industries by 1 to 2 percent. However 
the negative effects on productivity are much smaller. After controlling for all firm specific 
characteristics we have only found strongly significant effects for the wholesale and retail 
sector. In case of the other three industries the negative effect on productivity disappeared.  
We should mention that the Hansen test of over-identification restrictions indicate p-
values of 0.0000. However, in line with Roodman (2006), we claim that these p-values are 
mainly due to the fact that we have a large amount of data. Indeed, we have much more 
observations than Mohrenweiser and Zwick (2009) who also used system GMM in order to 
                                                        
5 For Table 2, we ran the regressions jointly for the four industries. However as a robustness check we estimated 
the regressions separately as well. Our results remained basically the same, the only difference that the 
negative productivity effects in the manufacturing sector became significant as well.  
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control for simultaneity. To test our claim, we estimated our results on a 5% random sample 
of data. Doing so, the estimated coefficients remained similar, although with much larger 
standard errors, and the test statistics of the Hansen test became very similar to the ones 
reported in Mohrenweiser and Zwick (2009). Moreover, Roodman (2006) argues that the 
Hansen test is prone to weakness, certainly when using many instruments on a small dataset. 
Therefore, the tests on instrument validity should be interpreted with caution. To conclude, 
we argue that system GMM still can be considered first-best, besides fixed effects or first-
difference models, in terms of estimating potentially causal effects.  
Since we have full work history for the workers in our dataset, we are able to distinguish 
between unexperienced apprentices (<1 year of experience at the firm) and more experienced 
apprentices (>1 year of experience at the firm). It expected that in particular experienced 
apprentices can perform skilled tasks during their apprenticeship, and, hereby, replace 
regular low-skilled workers. Table 4. presents the results in line with Table 3., but then for 
experienced and unexperienced apprentices separately.  
The results indicate that for the sectors construction and wholesale and retail both types 
of apprentices have similar, negative, impacts on firms’ gross profits. Contrary, for the sectors 
manufacturing and hotels and restaurant, it does matter for gross profit whether you 
train/employ an unexperienced or an experienced apprentice. The estimated coefficient for 
experienced apprentices for the sector hotels and restaurant and manufacturing has a 
positive sign, not significant for the former sector, and significant at 10-percent level for the 
latter sector. 
To conclude, for the sectors manufacturing, and wholesale and retail, training 
experienced apprentices decrease productivity more than training unexperienced 
apprentices. Although taking the standard errors into account the estimated coefficients do 
not differ that much, most of the confidence intervals overlap. So it seems that hiring 
apprentices decreases the firms per capita productivity in case of both experienced and 
unexperienced apprentices. However in the manufacturing and the hotels and restaurants 
sector the increase of the share of experienced apprentices increases or at least does not 
decrease gross profits of the firm.  
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    Table 4.  
System GMM Results for unexperienced and experienced apprentices 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 
Productivity Gross Profit Productivity Gross Profit 
y(t-1) 0.261*** 0.291*** 0.245*** 0.276*** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Apprentice Share Manufacturing 
    Unexperienced -1.586 -2.835*** -0.058 -2.235*** 
 
(1.580) (0.383) (1.346) (0.376) 
Experienced -2.689*** -0.092 -2.781*** 0.581** 
 
(0.785) (0.302) (0.656) (0.291) 
Apprentice Share Construction 
    Unexperienced -2.572*** -1.235*** -2.125*** -0.804** 
 
(0.591) (0.339) (0.661) (0.355) 
Experienced -2.205*** -1.061*** -1.777*** -0.721** 
 
(0.743) (0.278) (0.655) (0.285) 
Apprentice Share Wholesale and 
Retail 
    Unexperienced -1.845 -2.271*** -1.278 -1.601*** 
 
(1.177) (0.489) (1.069) (0.480) 
Experienced -3.026*** -2.512*** -3.070*** -1.268*** 
 
(0.724) (0.289) (0.665) (0.278) 
Apprentice Share Hotels and 
Restaurants 
    Unexperienced -3.060*** -1.203*** -1.265 -0.736** 
 
(1.183) (0.396) (0.906) (0.381) 
Experienced -4.943*** -0.266 -1.601** 0.174 
 
(0.884) (0.318) (0.760) (0.298) 
Share of medium skilled yes yes yes yes 
Share of high skilled yes yes yes yes 
Log Depreciation yes yes yes yes 
Industry-year dummies yes yes yes yes 
Share of different age groups 
  
yes yes 
Share of people in second jobs 
  
yes yes 
Firm controls 
  
yes yes 
Observations 238,080 183,217 238,080 183,217 
Number of firms 41,377 37,453 41,377 37,453 
Number of instruments 448 448 458 458 
Wald chi2 1.280e+07 8204 31563 3.930e+06 
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1) in 
first differences (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) in 
first differences (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hansen test of over-identification 
restrictions (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Notes: Productivity and gross profit are measured per capita. The share of days worked by low skilled regular 
workers is the reference category. Significance level presented at 1-percent (***); 5-percent (**); and 10-percent 
(*). 
5.4 FIRM SIZE AND OWNERSHIP 
Earnings and mobility patterns may substantially differ by firm size or organizational type 
(Bougheas and Georgellis, 2004). Therefore, we estimated our previous specifications 
separately for different subgroups of firms by size6 and ownership7. We find that our results 
are mainly driven by small domestic firms (see Table A3 and A4. in the appendix). For 
medium sized firms, we find negative effects on productivity and gross profit per capita only 
for firms operating in the wholesale and retail sector. For big firms, the results were similar 
as for medium sized firms, but additionally we find significant negative effects on gross profit 
for the manufacturing sector as well.  
The results for domestic firms are very similar to our results for the whole sample 
presented in Table 3. For foreign firms we only found somewhat larger and significant 
negative effects for gross profits in the wholesale retail and the hotels and restaurant sector. 
Our sample of foreign firms is much smaller and there are significantly less foreign firms 
participating in apprenticeship training, so these results may be driven by a few special firms. 
5.5 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
In Table 5. we show our system GMM results separately for before (2003-2007) and after 
(2008-2011) the financial crisis. We can conclude that our results are mostly driven by the 
pre-crisis period. After 2008, we only find significant negative effects for gross profit in the 
wholesale and retail sector. All other estimated negative effects disappear.  
Based on these results we argue that while initially firms hired apprentices despite the 
negative effects on gross profits, a larger fraction of training firms followed the investment 
strategy to gain future employees with firm specific human capital. Over time, however, more 
firms, that initially followed the investment strategy, switched to the substitution strategy in 
order to substitute away from low-skilled regular workers towards cheaper apprentices to 
perform basic skilled tasks. This particularly holds for the sectors manufacturing and hotels 
and restaurants.  
 
                                                        
6 Small firms – less than 10 employees; Medium sized firms – 10-50 employees; and Big firms – more than 50 
employees. 
7 Domestic majority ownership or foreign majority ownership. 
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Table 5. 
System GMM results for before and after the crisis 
  2003-2007 2008-2011 
 Model (3) Model (4) Model (3) Model (4) 
 
Productivity Gross Profit Productivity Gross Profit 
y(t-1) 0.242*** 0.235*** 0.321*** 0.215*** 
 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) 
Apprentice Share Manufacturing -0.388 -1.051 0.704 0.076 
 
(0.470) (0.670) (0.779) (0.605) 
Apprentice Share Construction -0.413 -1.630*** 0.532 0.155 
 
(0.435) (0.606) (0.426) (0.653) 
Apprentice Share Wholesale and Retail -1.362*** -2.438*** -0.599 -1.366* 
 
(0.232) (0.547) (0.472) (0.782) 
Apprentice Share Hotels and Restaurants 0.008 -1.366** -0.468 0.437 
 
(0.216) (0.624) (0.358) (0.762) 
Share of medium skilled yes yes yes yes 
Share of high skilled yes yes yes yes 
Log Depreciation yes yes yes yes 
Industry-year dummies yes yes yes yes 
Share of different age groups yes yes yes yes 
Share of people in second jobs yes yes yes yes 
Firm controls yes yes yes yes 
     Observations 119,616 93,471 87,126 65,435 
Number of firms 36,152 31,524 32,804 27,138 
Number of instruments 110 110 71 71 
Wald chi2 19,257 12,435 17,742 10,498 
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1) in first 
differences (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hansen test of over-identification restrictions 
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.321*** 0.215*** 
Notes: Productivity and gross profit are measured per capita. The share of days worked by low skilled regular 
workers is the reference category. Significance level presented at 1-percent (***); 5-percent (**); and 10-percent 
(*). 
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Figure 2.  
Substitute away from low skilled labour towards hiring apprentices 
 
Figure 2. demonstrates that firms hired an increasing number of apprentices over the 
examined time period, while, at the same time, the retention rate declined from around 20% 
in 2003 to around 10% in 2011. These numbers are much slower than the 61.5%-77% 
reported in Mohrenweiser and Zwick (2009) for Germany. As mentioned in the introduction 
Horn (2016) provides direct evidence that students graduating from vocational training 
schools face similar employment chances regardless of their place of practical training. His 
findings also indicate that the majority of firms use apprentices simply as a cheaper 
substitute for low skilled regular workers. Our results also suggest that after the crisis 
following substitution strategy among firms became even more prominent.  
Figure 3.  
Separation and hiring rate of low skilled workers in firms with apprentices 
 
Figure 3. shows the change in separation (on the left) and hiring rates (on the right) of 
low skilled workers over time in firms who also participated in apprenticeship training (had 
at least one apprentice). It can be seen that in 2008, presumably because of the financial 
crisis there was spike in separation of low skilled workers and a big decline in hiring rates in 
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the following year. In 2010 and 2011 labour turnover seems to be going back to the previous 
levels, however in Figure 2. we observe a steady increase in the number of hired apprentices 
between 2008 and 2011. These patterns also support our claim that in the time of the crisis 
firms increasingly used apprentices as substitutes for low skilled regular workers.   
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper provides first time evidence on the effectiveness of apprentice training in Hungary 
in terms of per capita productivity and gross profit. Using different empirical methods that 
facilitate a causal interpretation of our results, we conclude that apprentices are not 
profitable for most Hungarian firms. Compared to regular low-skilled workers, apprentices, 
in particular, those who have less than one year of experience at the firm, decrease firm 
productivity and gross profits in particular in the sectors manufacturing and wholesale and 
retail. The estimated effects are generally small. Contrary, experienced apprentices increase 
gross profits in manufacturing, a sector that witnessed a substantial shift over time from the 
investment strategy to the substitution strategy. Additionally, our results indicate that firms 
changed strategy after the financial crisis in 2008 and followed substitution strategy more 
and more.  
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APPENDIX  
Table A1. 
Sample Selection 
  
Number of 
observations 
Number of 
firms 
Baseline sample of private firms 1,751,279 415,657 
Firms with at least 4 observations 1,386,202 212,361 
Min 3 year gap between observations 1,341,924 203,265 
Mean number of employees > 5 47,979 63,141 
Only 4 industries with most apprentices 308,327 43,214 
 
Table A2. 
OLS Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Productivity 
Gross 
Profit Productivity 
Gross 
Profit 
Apprentice Share Manufacturing -1.106*** -2.008*** -0.534*** -1.444*** 
 
(0.115) (0.260) (0.109) (0.209) 
Apprentice Share Construction -0.695*** -1.300*** -0.324*** -1.040*** 
 
(0.095) (0.193) (0.088) (0.172) 
Apprentice Share Wholesale and Retail -2.057*** -3.336*** -1.124*** -2.108*** 
 
(0.141) (0.288) (0.114) (0.213) 
Apprentice Share Hotels and Restaurants -0.386*** -1.154*** -0.051 -0.961*** 
 
(0.089) (0.206) (0.088) (0.180) 
Share of medium skilled yes yes yes yes 
Share of high skilled yes yes yes yes 
Log Depreciation yes yes yes yes 
Industry-year dummies yes yes yes yes 
Share of different age groups 
  
yes yes 
Share of people in second jobs 
  
yes yes 
Firm controls 
  
yes yes 
     Observations 286,647 239,290 286,647 239,290 
Adjusted R-squared 0.323 0.312 0.373 0.411 
Notes: Productivity and gross profit are measured per capita. The share of days worked by low skilled regular 
workers is the reference category. Significance level presented at 1-percent (***); 5-percent (**); and 10-percent 
(*). 
 Table A3. 
System GMM results by firm size 
  Small Medium Big 
  Model (3)  Model (4) Model (3) Model (4) Model (3) Model (4) 
  Productivity 
Gross 
Profit Productivity 
Gross 
Profit Productivity 
Gross 
Profit 
y(t-1) 0.251*** 0.203*** 0.345*** 0.287*** 0.564*** 0.385*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.029) (0.020) 
Apprentice Share 
Manufacturing -0.256 -1.924** 0.505* -0.849 -0.533 -4.024*** 
 
(0.354) (0.827) (0.303) (0.709) (0.701) (1.556) 
Apprentice Share 
Construction -0.506 -1.061 -0.381 -0.886 -0.675 -0.506 
 
(0.280) (0.459) (0.289) (0.610) (0.826) (2.029) 
Apprentice Share 
Wholesale and Retail -0.662*** -1.865*** -0.988*** -2.255*** -1.634*** -8.007*** 
 
(0.244) (0.537) (0.283) (0.743) (0.603) (1.740) 
Apprentice Share Hotels 
and Restaurants -0.311 -1.090** -0.010 -0.095 -0.068 1.274 
 
(0.167) (0.540) (0.229) (0.510) (0.858) (1.740) 
Share of medium skilled yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
Share of high skilled yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
Log Depreciation yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
Industry-year dummies yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
Share of different age 
groups yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
Share of people in second 
jobs yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       Observations 103,324 77,053 86,494 69,366 22,494 18,149 
Number of firms 24,359 20,947 20,636 18,033 4,516 4,003 
Number of instruments 342 342 342 342 342 342 
Wald chi2 13414 9183 16061 9829 3.108e+06 560894 
Arellano–Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences (p-
value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Arellano–Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences 
(p-value) 1.22e-08 7.78e-08 6.02e-07 1.59e-08 0.365 0.148 
Hansen test of over-
identification restrictions 
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: Productivity and gross profit are measured per capita. The share of days worked by low skilled regular 
workers is the reference category. Significance level presented at 1-percent (***); 5-percent (**); and 10-percent 
(*). 
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Table A4. 
System GMM results by ownership 
  Domestic Foreign 
  Model (3) Model (4) Model (3) Model (4) 
  Productivity Gross Profit Productivity Gross Profit 
y(t-1) 0.262*** 0.234*** 0.421*** 0.371*** 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.022) (0.020) 
Apprentice Share Manufacturing -0.139 -1.745*** 1.147 0.817 
 
(0.275) (0.442) (0.916) (1.261) 
Apprentice Share Construction -0.356* -1.084*** 2.036 3.639 
 
(0.212) (0.371) (4.209) (6.382) 
Apprentice Share Wholesale and Retail -1.118*** -1.848*** -1.343 -7.232** 
 
(0.171) (0.414) (1.849) (3.339) 
Apprentice Share Hotels and Restaurants -0.390** -1.201*** 0.638 -3.095** 
 
(0.164) (0.407) (1.218) (1.357) 
Share of medium skilled yes yes yes yes 
Share of high skilled yes yes yes yes 
Log Depreciation Yes yes yes yes 
Industry-year dummies yes yes yes yes 
Share of different age groups yes yes yes yes 
Share of people in second jobs yes yes yes yes 
Firm controls yes yes yes yes 
     Observations 210,732 162,482 25,605 19,497 
Number of firms 37,145 33,658 5,023 4,313 
Number of instruments 345 345 330 330 
Wald chi2 22875 14326 3997 486548 
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1) in first 
differences (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.0739 0.0258 
Hansen test of over-identification 
restrictions (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.26e-09 
Notes: Productivity and gross profit are measured per capita. The share of days worked by low skilled regular 
workers is the reference category. Significance level presented at 1-percent (***); 5-percent (**); and 10-percent. 
